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Abstract 
We study the performance of Virtual Stock Markets (VSMs) in an institutional forecasting environment. We 
compare VSMs to the Combined Judgmental Forecast (CJF) and the Key Informant (KI) approach. We find 
that VSMs can be effectively applied in an environment with a small number of knowledgeable informants, 
i.e., in thin markets. Our results show that none of the three approaches differ in forecasting accuracy in a 
low knowledge-heterogeneity environment. However, where there is high knowledge-heterogeneity, the VSM 
approach outperforms the CJF approach, which in turn outperforms the KI approach. Hence, our results 
provide useful insight into when each of the three approaches might be most effectively applied. 
 
1. Introduction 
Firms and institutions of all sorts rely on forecasts of their business activities for planning, scheduling 
and investment decisions. The domain of forecast use ranges from territorial sales forecasts, input factor price 
forecasts, forecasts of competitive response to a new market entry, forecasts of revenues in a new geography, 
currency forecasts and many more. The forecasting literature (see (Evans 2002), for example) goes to great 
length to describe the “art and science” of forecasting, where the “art” refers to the use of some form of 
managerial judgment and the “science” is based on historical data and some form of statistical or econometric 
analysis. 
Institutional forecasts often take place in conditions where there is little or no appropriate historical 
data or where formal methods or models for developing the forecasts are not available. Furthermore, either 
cost or secrecy concerns often preclude customer surveys as data sources for such forecasts. Examples of 
such situations include developing a sales forecast for a new market, a new sales territory or a new product, 
forecasting the price response of a competitor after the firm introduces a new product, predicting the sales 
response to a major change in an advertising program and others. The institutional informants in such situations 
include sales representatives, marketing analysts, business managers and others. Such institutional forecasts 
are beneficial particularly in situations where cost and time constraints limit large customer surveys and 
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information about the forecasting topic should remain confidential as is typically the case with new initiatives. 
The institutional forecasting problems we deal with here share the following characteristics: i) there is little or 
no directly relevant data available; ii) significant volatility or uncertainty is involved (typical in new or rapidly 
changing markets); iii) no single informant can know the “true” value in advance. iv) there are more than one 
but still a small number of informants whose knowledge can be tapped who may (partially, at least) disagree and 
differ in expertise; and v) the forecasts are updated over a period of time.  
Armstrong (2001 p. 376) provides a taxonomy of forecasting methods, with the most appropriate 
method depending largely on whether or not sufficient objective data are available, whether or not good 
knowledge of relationships between variables exists, and whether or not large changes in the environment or 
conditions are expected. The various forecasting approaches differ with respect to their accuracy and ease of 
implementation (Chen, Fine, and Huberman 2003). Armstrong (2001) identifies formal combining rules as 
well as approaches as the Delphi method to elicit and combine forecasts from the multiple informants in such 
situations. Yet, Armstrong (2001) does not cite the so-called Virtual Stock Market (VSM) approach as an 
alternative. VSMs have been (successfully) applied to predict election outcomes (e.g., the Iowa Electronic 
Markets), the success of movies (e.g., the Hollywood Stock Exchange), sports results (e.g., Tradesports), and 
future economic data releases (e.g., economicderivatives.com). Ostrover (2005) cites several examples of 
VSMs used in institutional forecasting applications: Hewlett Packard (HP) uses VSMs to forecast sales, 
financial, and accounting results while Eli Lilly uses a VSM to identify those drugs in the early stages of 
development that are most likely to win approval. The results of these applications suggest that VSMs may be 
an effective approach to institutional forecasting in settings with a relatively large number of participants. 
However, we could find no reports of VSMs that were applied and compared to other forecasting techniques 
in the subset of the institutional forecasting domain where there are only few (knowledgeable) informants. 
Our goal is to study the feasibility and accuracy of VSMs in the type of institutional forecasting 
domain outlined above. We seek insight into the problems of whether, why, and when a VSM is likely to 
outperform more traditional approaches, which we call Combining Judgmental Forecasts (CJFs). We provide 
a reference point for our analysis by also considering the forecasting accuracy of a single, key informant (KI), 
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where the key informant is a most knowledgeable agent of the institution.  
We study the feasibility and accuracy of VSMs for two types of forecasting settings. The first involves 
a situation where the informants are in similar circumstances and thus have access to common information.  
Regular, regional sales forecasts based on the judgments of a group of sales representatives is a typical 
example of such a setting. We describe such a setting as one with low knowledge heterogeneity. The second, less 
routine forecasting task is one where there is little common information (perhaps with more private 
information) and hence where informants may differ significantly in the type and quality of the information 
they have available. A forecast of the market performance of a new product by the various people (e.g., 
marketing, R&D) involved in developing and introducing it is an example of this second setting. We 
characterize such a setting as one with high knowledge heterogeneity. 
We find that in high knowledge-heterogeneity environments, forecasts made through VSMs are more 
accurate than those developed by CJFs, which are in turn more accurate than those from KIs. In low 
knowledge-heterogeneity environments, we find that none of the approaches dominate. 
The paper proceeds as follows: we first review alternative approaches to institutional forecasting, 
including the opportunities afforded by VSMs. We then contrast the differences between VSMs and the more 
traditional approaches, leading us to several hypotheses about the expected differences in forecasting accuracy 
between VSMs, CFSs and a KI. We next describe the design of our empirical study and present our results. 
We conclude with a discussion of those results and their implications. 
2. Institutional Forecasting: A Comparison of Approaches 
Widely used approaches for institutional forecasting include both using a single (key) informant and 
using multiple informants, including the Delphi Method (see for example (Armstrong 2001)). We review 
these below and then contrast them with the VSM approach.  
2.1 A Single, Key Informant (KI). Perhaps the most widely used approach in practice, because of its 
simplicity, is the single or key-informant approach, where the informant is most often selected because of 
knowledge and willingness to communicate that knowledge. The approach suffers from significant drawbacks 
(Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993), including bias, random error, and the inability to aggregate information 
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spread across multiple informants. Armstrong (2001) summarizes much research that shows that single 
informant reports are systematically outperformed by those of multiple informants when those multiple 
informant reports are appropriately combined. 
2.2 Multiple Informants—Combining Judgmental Forecasts (CJF). CJF takes advantage of the knowledge of 
multiple informants and combines the information from those multiple informants into an overall statement. 
The strategies to combine varying information differ markedly depending upon whether or not the 
informants interact. Mechanistic aggregation algorithms such as forming simple or weighted averages are used 
when informants do not interact (Garthwaite, Kadane, and O'Hagan 2005). Van Bruggen, Lilien, and Kacker 
(2002) propose ideas for improving weighted averages. In particular, they show that the use of confidence 
and competence scores as weights improve forecasting accuracy. Yet, the mechanistic approach can lead to a 
form of double counting of expertise if the knowledge of various experts overlaps substantially. In addition 
and by definition, the approach prevents informants from sharing information to learn from one another 
(Garthwaite et al. 2005). 
Behavioral aggregation encourages and facilitates aggregation, permitting information sharing 
(Garthwaite et al. 2005). However, the approach may lead to difficulties in reaching consensus and even if 
consensus is reached, that consensus may be influenced by power and personality rather than by knowledge. 
Garthwaite et al. (2005), Kumar et al. (1993) and Sunstein (2005) discuss the influence of censorship, 
Groupthink, and the difficulty of organizing and facilitating the needed interactions on forecasting accuracy. 
They also mention the Delphi Method, developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950’s, as an alternative 
(Schmidt 1997): informants share their forecasts and their reasoning anonymously and the process cycles until 
a consensus emerges. The approach mitigates the impact of personalities and empirical evidence supports the 
accuracy of Delphi forecasts (Rowe and Wright 2001). However, the Delphi approach also suffers from 
logistical problems and eliminates any positive aspects of informants knowing the identity of other 
informants: one might wish to place greater weight on the opinion of a very experienced manager rather that 
that of a novice, independent of the quality of the argument of either. The approach is also not conducive to 
frequent updating as the relevant environment changes. 
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To sharpen our focus and to align our work with practice, we study survey-based CJF approaches 
here, noting that the key informant (KI) approach is a special case of a CJF, with 100% weight on the key 
informant. 
2.3 Virtual Stock Markets (VSMs). VSMs create information markets, bringing groups of participants 
together over electronic communication networks such as the Internet and allowing them to trade shares of 
virtual stocks that represent a bet on the outcome of a future market situation (Spann and Skiera 2003). VSMs 
elicit and aggregate information that may be widely dispersed across a large number of public and private 
sources, through the mechanism of trading. Such markets play three important roles (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
2004): they provide i) incentives to seek information; ii) incentives for truthful information revelation; and iii) 
an algorithm for aggregating diverse opinions. Gruca, Berg, and Cipriano (2003), Ostrover (2005) and others 
discuss the benefits of VSMs in terms of cost, speed, sampling, response bias, dealing with outliers, natural 
updating and the like. 
Ostrover (2005) cites five  reasons why VSMs should be expected to work in the type of institutional 
settings that we address here: i) participation: everyone with access to relevant information can contribute; ii) 
motivation: a properly designed reward mechanism incents participants to acquire relevant information and 
reveal their beliefs (Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross 1999); iii) anonymity: VSMs eliminate fear of reprisal for 
revealing unpopular beliefs ; iv) coordination: markets provide a natural mechanism for active group interplay; 
and v) computation: markets provide a natural aggregation mechanism.  
In a VSM, informants, acting as traders, reveal and share public and private information through 
their trading behavior. VSMs thus have the ability to disseminate information from informed traders to 
uninformed traders (Plott and Sunder 1982; Plott and Sunder 1988). If markets are efficient, all available 
information is reflected in prices (Fama 1970). Thus, the price of a specific stock in an efficient VSM reflects 
all information (public and private) on the corresponding state (value) of interest and can thus serve as a 
forecast. Hence, the use of a VSM as an aggregation and forecasting mechanism hinges on its efficiency. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Oliven and Rietz (2004) argue that perfect information aggregation 
is impossible. Others (Spann and Skiera 2003; Sunder 1992) note that if the number of insiders is very small, 
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informational efficiency might not be achieved. In markets where different traders have different information 
signals, the presence of aggregate information uncertainty significantly reduces market efficiency relative to 
markets with aggregate information certainty (Lundholm 1991). In institutional forecasting settings, complete 
and certain information will rarely exist. Therefore, it is an open question whether VSMs will do well for 
institutional forecasting. Furthermore, over-confident traders may affect prices in the market if they stick to 
their forecasts irrespective of the (perhaps better informed) opinions of other traders. According to Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz (2004) prediction markets display some of the deviations from rationality that appear in other 
financial markets as well. For example, speculative bubbles may drive prices away from likely outcomes. 
A threat to the informational efficiency of VSMs thus appears when the number of insiders is small 
(Spann and Skiera 2003; Sunder 1992), of particular relevance to us here. In these so-called thin markets 
problems like information traps, manipulation and lack of equilibrium are exacerbated (Chen et al. 2003; 
Chen, Fine, and Huberman 2004). A lack of experience in playing in markets may also threaten the accuracy 
of VSMs relative to those of KI and CJFs. And VSMs may suffer from information cascades (Anderson and 
Holt 1997), when individuals overweight private information of other traders that has become public during 
the trading process and underweight their own private information. These latter problems may even out in 
“thick”, but not in  “thin” markets. 
Of relevance to us here is the extent to which the price reflects the “true” value of the variable of 
interest at a particular point in time. We conjecture that the answer to this question depends on the 
characteristics of the information being exchanged. First, when information is without uncertainty, it will be 
effectively communicated from traders who know what will happen in the future to those who lack such 
knowledge. Second, when information is complete (the extent to which the sum of information possessed by the 
various traders reveals the true state of nature), then market prices will provide accurate predictions of 
unknown events. Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) and Lundholm (1991) show that when uncertainty is 
introduced into the information provided to traders or if the set of information as a whole is incomplete, then 
market prices deviate from their true, underlying value. 
Summarizing the discussion above, there are several reasons to expect VSMs to do well in the 
 6
domain of institutional forecasting but there is also research that suggests that VSMs may not work optimally, 
especially when the number of informants is relatively small. To our knowledge, with the possible exception 
of the study of  Gruca et al. (2003), which differs significantly in design from ours, there are no studies that 
empirically compare the forecasts of VSMs with those of CJFs in the environments we focus on here. 
3. Virtual Stock Markets (VSMs) Versus Combining Judgmental Forecasts (CJF) 
To guide our development of hypotheses about expected differences in forecasting accuracy between 
VSMs and CJFs (and, by implication, the special case of KI), we compare these approaches along three key 
information dimensions: i) information elicitation; ii) information exchange; and iii) information aggregation. 
Information Elicitation is the process of formulating an individual’s forecast. It is important to 
distinguish between the quality of a informant’s forecast and the accuracy with which that forecast is 
obtained. A forecast is elicited well if the value that is derived accurately represents the informant’s 
knowledge, regardless of how good that knowledge is (Garthwaite et al. 2005). 
In the CJF approach, informants provide direct forecasts for the variable of interest as well as self-
assessments of their confidence and answers to questions measuring their competence. This approach is 
straightforward and (relatively) easy for informants. A weakness may be that the judgments in these settings 
may be based on a limited number of mental operations, which potentially may lead to biased assessments 
(Garthwaite et al. 2005). This weakness may also apply for confidence and competence assessments. 
Furthermore, reasons may exist for informants not to disclose information honestly. With VSMs, informants 
provide information in an indirect manner through their trading behavior. This approach provides anonymity 
and a seemingly clear incentive for participants to reveal their true beliefs, i.e., participants are rewarded based 
on their market-performance. However, the market mechanism may also provide incentives for speculation 
and trading in an information market as well as may not be easily understandable for all informants. Hence, 
both approaches have advantages and disadvantages on the dimension of information elicitation. 
Information Exchange: Informants base their responses in the CJF approach and their trading behavior 
in VSMs on a combination of public and private information, i.e., information unique to or held by one 
specific trader (Chen et al. 2003). The CJF approach does not allow for information exchange between 
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informants and, hence, they cannot learn from other informants: the mechanism does not lead to consensus 
and informants with little or highly biased knowledge are not able to learn from others. Since in VSMs private 
information is exchanged through the market mechanism, the price system makes information publicly 
available and thereby transfers it from informed to uninformed traders (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). A 
potential problem may be that information that is exchanged may be biased. Summarizing, the VSM approach 
offers clear advantages to the CJF approach on information exchange. 
Information Aggregation is the procedure that combines the opinions of individual informant forecasts 
to arrive at a single forecast. With CJF, the researcher does the aggregation, employing either a simple average 
or a more sophisticated weighted average. Indeed, some quite complex weighting procedures have been 
developed, including non-linear aggregation rules (Chen et al. 2004) and Bayesian procedures. Van Bruggen et 
al. (2002) show that confidence and competence based weights are quite effective and can outperform simple 
averages. These weighting approaches make the aggregation rule transparent. Weaknesses of these 
approaches include the possible double-counting of informants (several informants could have highly 
correlated knowledge) as well as the logical problem of averaging two (or more) widely divergent views which 
may lead to an inappropriate “compromise”. For example, if informants all believe a new product's sales will 
be “high” if the industry adopts a certain technical standard and “low” otherwise, but differ in their beliefs 
about the likelihood of that standard being adopted, any non-trivial weighting rule will lead to a forecast of an 
intermediate level of sales, a result that no individual informant believes will occur. A VSM simultaneously 
performs information aggregation, dissemination, and conflict resolution (Plott and Sunder 1988): the market 
performs the weighting procedure. The approach is efficient and, according to the “crystal ball” hypothesis 
(Plott and Sunder 1982), the market equilibrium may reflect even more information than the sum of what is 
available to individual traders. A possible weakness of a VSM is that trading will be based on the strengths of 
beliefs of traders and these beliefs are not necessarily (fully) in line with reality (Stracca 2004). Summarizing, 
both approaches have strengths and weaknesses with respect to aggregating information of multiple 
informants. VSMs also have the advantage that once they have been set up, it is easy for researchers to 
observe prices (and thus forecasts) on a continuous basis and also see how these forecasts change as a 
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consequence of (important) events. 
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the VSM and the CJF approaches. Information 
exchange is the main difference between VSMs and CJF. This information exchange is beneficial if an 
information-asymmetry between informants is present: it permits individual (private) knowledge to become 
public and allows less knowledgeable informants to update and increase their knowledge. This updating 
process leads to less knowledge-heterogeneity and higher average knowledge. 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
We thus posit that information exchange should lead to improved institutional forecasts (i.e., VSMs 
should outperform CJF) if there is a major difference in knowledge between informants, that is, if different 
informants possess different types of information or different “pieces of the puzzle.” In other words, if the 
market is efficient, the accuracy in forecasting for a VSM should at least be equal to or exceed the accuracy of 
the most knowledgeable informant, I, i.e,  
Accuracy of Group (VSM) >=  Max (Accuracy I1, Accuracy I2,.... Accuracy In ..), 
while for CJF,  
Accuracy of Group (CJF) ~ (Weighted) Mean (Accuracy I1, Accuracy I2,.. Accuracy In) 
In fact, following our “different pieces of the puzzle” argument, the VSM should strictly outperform the CJF, 
since a VSM permits integrating and sharing of information. Hence, if these accuracy suppositions hold, then 
VSMs should be at least as good as CJF in all cases and should significantly outperform CJF in situations of 
high information heterogeneity (i.e., where any weighting of the maximal accuracy will be well above the 
weighted regardless for any weighting scheme). 
As the Key Informant (KI) is a special case of CJF, with all weight given to the specific key 
informant, the discussion above about CJF applies here. However, as the KI approach discards information 
from the non-key informants (who will still possess some “part of the puzzle”), we expect that KI will 
perform more poorly than both the VSM and than the CJF method when there is high information 
heterogeneity. When there is low knowledge-heterogeneity, however, the KI will have internalized that 
information and, hence, is not likely to do significantly more poorly than either CJF or VSM.  
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More formally, we hypothesize: 
H1:  If there is low knowledge-heterogeneity between informants, none of the approaches VSM, CJF or KI will differ 
significantly in terms of forecasting accuracy. 
H2a: If there is high knowledge-heterogeneity between informants, VSMs will outperform the CJF approach in terms of 
forecasting accuracy. 
H2b: If there is high knowledge- heterogeneity, the CJF approach will outperform the KI approach in terms of forecasting 
accuracy  
4. Method 
To test these hypotheses, we sought a forecasting task where we could compare the forecasting accuracy 
of the VSM and the CJF approach in situations with different knowledge-heterogeneity. We also sought a 
between-subjects design to control for dependencies between tasks. We wanted to allow for an updating 
process to assimilate feedback and market information in a natural setting, requiring an intertemporal design. 
Our institutional estimation framework required groups of a relatively small number of informants to create a 
“market” (in the VSM environment) and to aggregate in a formal manner for the CJF. In addition, we needed 
situations where there was the opportunity for both heterogeneous knowledge and homogenous knowledge. 
We argue that forecasting environments differ in degree of knowledge across informants and that at least 
the following four characteristics differentiate between domains of high and low knowledge-heterogeneity: (1) 
Presence and Strength of an Anchor Point for the Forecasted Variable: a strong anchor point affects all informants and 
leads to more homogeneity; (2) Amount of Public vs. Private Knowledge: more public relative to private knowledge 
should lead to more homogeneity; (3) Inherent Predictability: high inherent predictability of the variable under 
study should lead to more homogeneity. (4) Environmental Variability: closely related to (3), low variability in 
the environment during the forecasting period should lead to more homogeneity. In addition, informants may 
simply have more inherent knowledge about some items to be forecasted than others. 
We had ready access to undergraduate and graduate business students as potential experimental subjects. 
After screening a number of alternative tasks, we found that a financial market forecasting task for a widely 
traded commodity fit the low heterogeneity criteria well and forecasting the point spread in a future college 
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football game (absolute difference in score between winning and losing team) matched the high heterogeneity 
criteria. For example, for the college football point spreads there is a relatively weak anchor point: changes in 
lineups, field conditions, and the like lead to weak anchors, while the general stability of many financial 
market indices makes current prices strong anchors. Similarly for public versus private information: most 
students saw the indices they were trading or forecasting (as well as speculations about them) on a daily basis, 
while only the more knowledgeable and dedicated football fans used news group and additional information 
sources on the Internet. A similar argument follows for inherent predictability (with college football scores 
inherently unpredictable): for example our results show that at the beginning of the forecasting period (22 
days before the event or the close of trading) the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) for the football 
point spreads was .42 while it was .11 for the financial indices (a difference significant at p=0.000). 
Arguments for Environmental Uncertainty and Inherent Knowledge (coefficient of variation was 0.302 for 
football knowledge and 0.198 for financial knowledge) follow similarly. 
The specific football point spread task was to predict the score for two games (to be played on 20 
November 2004): Michigan vs. Ohio State  (labeled here OSU) and Florida vs. Florida State (labeled here 
FSU) while for financial indices the task was to forecast the Dow Jones Index and the Crude Oil Spot Market 
Price (Texas Intermediate) on 20 November 2004. 
We formed 21 experimental groups consisting of 6 individual informants, each in one of two conditions: 
• Condition 1: consisting of 11 groups predicting the football point spreads through the CJF approach 
and participating in VSMs for financial indices. 
• Condition 2: consisting of 10 groups predicting the financial indices through the CJF approach and 
participating in VSMs for football point spreads. 
Our 126 subjects were selected after a pre-experimental assessment (Appendix A) of their football 
and financial knowledge. To qualify, participants had to get 7 or more football questions correct and 8 or 
more finance questions correct.  
Incentives: Participants were informed in writing that they would receive both a (fixed) participation 
payment and an additional compensation based on their performance. Performance compensation in the 
 11
VSM was linearly related to the value of the participant’s portfolio at the end of the study. Their CJF 
compensation was based on the participant's mean overall financial index price or point spread prediction 
accuracy. These compensation schemes were designed to provide both significant and similar incentives for 
all participants to apply effort attention to these tasks. 
The VSMs were opened for 22 days prior to 20 November 2004. Participants were also required to 
provide forecasts in the CJF task four times during those 22 days, via an electronic survey. They also provided 
confidence scores. We assessed competence via a separate knowledge questionnaire given at the time the 
study began (Appendix B) where we measured competence as the number of correctly answered questions. 
Operation of the VSMs. Each VSM was comprised of six (anonymous) individuals in a condition and 
two different stocks. Depending on the condition, the stocks represented either the value of a football point-
spread or the value of a financial index on 20 November 2004. The payoff function (the cash-out price) for 
the football point-spread stock types gives $1 (virtual) for every point in the point-spread: 
(1)  i=1,2.  id Z= i
where:  
id : Cash dividend of the stock modeling the outcome of the i-th football game, 
iZ : (Absolute value of) point-spread of the i-th football game. 
For the financial indices, we use two different payoff functions in order to adjust for the different 
scale levels of the financial indices. The shares of the stock for the price of crude oil pay $1 (virtual) for every 
$1 (real) per barrel of crude oil (see equation (2)). The shares of the stocks for the Dow pay $1 (virtual) for 
every 1,000 points of this index (see equation (3)). 
(2)   crude cruded Z=
(3) 
1,000
Dow
Dow
Zd =   
where:  
cruded : Cash dividend of the stock modeling the price of crude oil on November 20th, 2004, 
Dowd : Cash dividend of the stock modeling the value of the Dow on November 20th, 2004, 
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crudeZ : Price of crude oil on November 20th, 2004, 
DowZ : Value of the Dow on November 20th, 2004. 
Thus, the price of a share of stock for a specific football game or financial index represents a 
prediction of its value on 20 November 2004 by inverting the payoff function. We set the initial quotes for 
the football point-spreads based on the performances of the teams up to that date and the initial quotes for 
the financial indices based on their actual value on 27 October 2004. 
The experiment ran from 29 October to 19 November 2004. Participants received an initial 
endowment of 100 shares of each stock type in their group-specific VSM and $2,500 (virtual) cash. Based on 
their performance at the VSM (measured by the value of their final portfolio), participants received a bonus 
payment. Participants could trade 24 hours per day, seven days a week. There was no trading fee.  
Market Maker Trading Mechanism: our VSMs applied a two-sided automated market maker trading 
mechanism, comparable to the one used at Nasdaq to avoid the thin market problem that can arise due to our 
experimental setting of only six traders per market (Hanson 2003; Pennock 2004). Our market maker 
accepted every order from a participant and executed it at a pre-announced price that is identical for purchase 
or sale orders. That price was adjusted after every executed order by an automatic price adjustment 
procedure. 
The use of the market maker trading mechanism allowed participants to trade anytime at a pre-
announced price. Purchases increased the price p for the next order, sales decreased this price. The goal of 
our price adjustment mechanism was to set a price p according to an estimate of the stock’s true value V 
based on traders’ order flow: informed traders are aware of changes in V and trade accordingly (Das 2005). 
Each trade of a single stock represents a signal to the market maker. Therefore, the quantity of stocks per 
transaction as well as the number of transactions in the same direction (i.e. the number of purchases or sales) 
were indicators of the possible magnitude of the deviation between p and V. We applied this principle in 
determining the price adjustment based on a moving window of the last I transactions, accounting for volume 
and direction of each transaction. To increase robustness, we also used information about the maximum 
possible value of V to scale the magnitude of price adjustment per share. We tested our mechanism both 
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numerically and empirically before the application in our VSMs and set a maximum order quantity of 50 
shares to stabilize the markets. The latter characteristic led to more frequent price adjustments in case of large 
orders. Equation (4) gives our price adjustment function with the parameter values used in our experiment.  
(4) , ,
,
02
,max
, , 1 , , 2max ,1
n
j n j i
I
j n i
i
sig sigj
j n j n j n j n
q
p
p p sig q
I
αγ
−
=
=
−
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎨ ⎬+⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑
 
  with ,
1
1j n
for sale
sig
for purchase
−⎧= ⎨⎩ ,
10
10 10n
n for n I
I
for n I
< =⎧= ⎨ ≥ =⎩  (n>0, j∈J), 
where: 
,j np : Market maker price for j-th stock after the n-th trade, 
,j nq : Quantity of order of j-th stock at the n-th trade, 
,j nsig : Sign of the order of j-th stock at the n-th trade, 
,maxjp : Maximum price for j-th stock, 
nI : Length of moving average window, 
J:  Index set of stocks, 
γ : Scaling parameter (with γ = 500), 
α : Minimum tick size (with α = 0.01). 
Spann and Skiera (2003) develop prerequisites for a VSM to be efficient; our design, selection, and 
screening criteria meet those criteria. 
In Figure 1a-1d, we provide some illustrative screen shots that depict the environment the 
participants faced. The market prices in the VSMs during the 22-day trading period represented the forecasts. 
--- INSERT FIGURE 1A-1D ABOUT HERE --- 
CJF Procedure In order to create forecasts using the survey-based forecast of informants in the CJF 
conditions we created “virtual” groups consisting of 6 persons each. We randomly assigned subjects to 
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groups and ex-post analysis showed no significant differences between groups either with respect to financial 
knowledge (F=1.207, p=.294) or football knowledge (F=.333, p=.971). We developed aggregated forecasts 
for each 6-person group based on the questionnaire data for each of the 22 days. The values of the aggregated 
forecasts varied over the 22 days because all informants received the questionnaire at the same day, but were 
allowed to send it back on one of the following days. Hence, responses varied across the time period and our 
results are based on an aggregation of the most recent six forecasts at any point in time. Following the 
approach developed in Van Bruggen et al. (2002), we use three forecasts: i) an unweighted average of the 
forecasts of the 6 persons in each group; ii) a knowledge-based weighted average; and iii) a confidence-based 
weighted average. 
We compute the unweighted average forecast for group w at day t using Equation 5 
6
)5(
6
1
∑
== i
ftwi
ftw
Forecast
ForecastUnweighted , where 
Forecastftwi is the forecast of individual i,in group w, at day t, for index f. 
w = 1, .. , p (p = 11 for the football indices and p = 10 for the financial indices) 
t = 1, .. , 22 
f = 1, .. , 4 (1 = OSU point spread; 2 = FSU point spread; 3 = Dow Jones Index; 4 = Oil Price) 
We compute the knowledge-based forecast for group w at day t using Equation 6 
∑
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where Knowledgefi is the knowledge score of individual i about variable f measured using the test items 
described in Appendix B. 
We compute the confidence-based forecast for group w at day t using Equation 7 
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where Confidencefi is the knowledge of individual i about variable f. 
 
We also developed a Key-InformantForecastftw for each 6-person group. We selected the key informant as 
the informant with the highest knowledge score within the group according to the knowledge responses to 
the questions in Appendix B. We broke ties by selecting one key informant in a group at random.  
5. Results 
We compare the forecasting accuracy of the CJF-based measures and the VSM-based forecasts by 
computing the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) of the forecasts for the four variables Z1, Z2, Zcrude 
and ZDow. The MAPE is invariant to scale and not influenced by outliers and is computed as in Equation 8. 
f
ffmt
fmt NovemberatValueActual
NovemberatValueActualForecastfm
MAPE
20
20
)8(
−=  
Where:  
MAPEfmt is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error for variable f for method m, where 1 = unweighted 
aggregated CJF forecast, 2 = knowledge-based aggregated CJF forecast, 3 = confidence-based 
aggregated CJF forecast, 4 = key informant, and 5= VSM-based forecast) at day t.  
The actual (true) values of the four variables forecasted were as follows: 
Actual Point Spread Florida vs. Florida State: 7 
Actual Point Spread Ohio State vs. Michigan: 16 
Actual Crude Oil Price: $48.90 
Actual Dow Jones (divided by 1,000): $10.46 
Table 2 presents the average MAPE values of the key informants, of the various CJF-based forecasts 
and of the VSM-based forecasts for the financial indices and for the football point spreads across 12 days.  
Our VSMs ran for 22 days; we focus on  the middle 12 days for analysis here, eliminating the first 
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and the last five days of trading. As is common in such markets with a market maker setting the initial price 
or reacting to a jump in the stock’s true value, there is usually a transient period of volatility before the market 
settles to set a (new) price (Das 2005). And as our task involves forecasting, it is appropriate to establish a 
time interval between the VSM-established valuation and the realization of the actual valuation. Furthermore, 
during the last five days before the games were being played, bookmakers quotes were widely available and, 
per our study design, we wanted to avoid having our football VSMs anchored on these quotes. The results are 
graphically presented in Figure 2 and 3. (We replicated the analysis with the full data set (see Table 2A) and 
the results were similar to those reported here.)  
--- INSERT TABLE 2, TABLE 2A AND FIGURE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
Overall our results show that the values of the financial indices were more accurately predicted than 
the football point spreads (F=79.998, p=.000). The average MAPE across the various CJF approaches and 
VSMs is .072 for the financial indices while it is .488 for the football point spreads. Furthermore, we did not 
find significant differences between various CJF approaches. In contrast with the findings reported in Van 
Bruggen et al. (2002), we do not find weighted averages to do any better than unweighted averages. A 
possible explanation for this finding might lie in the screening procedure we applied before allowing 
participants to our study. Because of this screening, the variation in knowledge and confidence (these two 
variables were correlated) was reduced, which also reduced the effectiveness of the knowledge-based and 
confidence-based weights. This finding of a lack of effectiveness of the weighting approaches is in line with 
other research results (Armstrong 2001). 
Since we did not find any differences between the three CJF approaches we only analyze the 
unweighted CJF results further. These results show an interaction effect between the forecasting approaches 
(CJF vs. VSM) and the forecasting tasks (Football Point Spreads vs. Financial Indices) (F=2.350, p=.035). 
Furthermore, differences between the CJF approaches and the VSM change over time (F=1.312, p=.051), a 
result especially strong for the financial markets (see Figure 2). 
When predicting financial indices (low heterogeneity) there are no significant differences in the 
forecasting accuracy of CJF approaches, the KI approach and the VSMs. This finding supports H1. However, 
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closer inspection of Figure 2 shows a difference between the results for the first part of the experimental 
period and the second part. In the first part there is no substantial difference in forecasting accuracy between 
CJF, KI and VSM, while the CJF and KI approaches actually do somewhat better than the VSMs in the 
second part. The reason for the poor performance of the VSMs is not immediately clear. Participants in 
VSMs may have been hampered by the complexity of the VSMs relative to that of the task in the CJF 
conditions. The information exchange characteristics of VSMs may not sufficiently compensate for this 
complexity, possibly because there is not much additional information to be exchanged in the VSMs for the 
financial indices in the remaining time period. 
In contrast with predicting financial indices, when predicting the football point spreads (high 
heterogeneity between informants) the VSMs clearly outperform the CJF-based approaches, a result that 
supports H2a. Figure 3 also reveals that the KI forecasts of the football point spreads are clearly less accurate 
than both the CJF and the VSM results, providing support for H2b. 
Given the rather exploratory nature of this research, we performed additional analyses. We 
investigated how knowledge affected the CJF or VSM results; our analyses did not identify a relationship 
between either the average knowledge levels, the knowledge of the most knowledgeable informant or 
knowledge dispersion and the quality of forecast made through either VSMs or through the CJF approach. 
This lack of a relationship may, at least partly, be due to the fact that the selection and the screening of our 
participants were designed to reduce variance in background and knowledge.  
One finding of interest surrounds the link between informant knowledge (measured directly) and 
forecasting error. We found that the knowledge of our key informants was significantly related to the error of 
their forecast of the financial indices (r=-.392, p=.088), with the more knowledgeable informants being the 
more accurate in low heterogeneity environments. We did not find any other links between informant 
knowledge and forecasting accuracy. 
Given the thin nature of our markets, we investigated the relationship between trading activity and 
accuracy. While we observed more active trading in the market for financial indices than for football point 
spreads, that difference was not significant. And in neither market type did we find a relationship between 
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level of trading activity and forecasting accuracy, suggesting that there seems to be sufficient trading activity 
even in these thin markets to reach a level of efficiency. We did, however, find a relationship between level of 
trading activity at the individual level and individual performance, suggesting that trading activity itself might 
be an indicator of market knowledge (r=.875, p=.000 for VSMs for financial indices and r=.362, p=.005 for 
VSMs for football point spreads). 
6. Discussion 
 We have investigated the feasibility and accuracy of Virtual Stock Markets (VSMs) in institutional 
forecasting situations, characterized by a small number of knowledgeable informants. We have compared that 
performance with that of the Combined Judgment (CJF) and Key Informant (KI) approach. 
 Our results show that VSM are feasible in environments with varying degrees of predictability and 
knowledge heterogeneity, and can be conducted effectively with group sizes as small as six traders per market. 
We find that VSMs outperform CJF and KI in more difficult-to-predict environments, characterized by high 
knowledge and information heterogeneity between informants. The approach works as well as the more 
traditional CJF and KI approaches in more homogeneous environments. We attribute this superior 
performance of VSMs in high knowledge-heterogeneity environments to their ability to provide for 
information exchange between participants: trader’s private information becomes public through their trades, 
thus enabling information dissemination and learning.  
 We also find that forecasts of both VSMs and CJFs are more accurate in situations of high 
knowledge-heterogeneity than those of KI. A possible explanation for this finding is that improved accuracy 
in a high knowledge-heterogeneity environment requires an integration or combining mechanism of some 
sort; such a mechanism is provided by a VSM or by CJF, but not by a KI. In this particular study, in contrast 
to past findings such as those by Van Bruggen, Lilien and Kacker (2002) we find no significant performance 
differences between the different weighting schemes we investigated (equal, confidence or knowledge based) 
for CJFs. This contrast with past results may be due to our pre-screening of participants, limiting knowledge-
heterogeneity and eliminating all low-knowledge participants.  
 The nature of these results raises interesting questions concerning both why and when VSMs should 
 19
be expected to perform well in the field. If information exchange and learning change participant’s 
knowledge, than VSMs have two inter-temporal advantages over CJF: First, all participants improve their 
knowledge over time through the exchange mechanism, mitigating the effect of low-knowledge participants. 
Second, if the weights used for aggregation in CJF, typically taken at a point in time, are not updated, those 
weights may become seriously suboptimal if the environment is unstable or highly unpredictable. A VSM, 
operating continuously, has the ability to aggregate such environmental and knowledge-based changes 
naturally and continuously and may also be effective in deriving informant weights for future analyses (see 
(Chen et al. 2004)). In more stable, low knowledge-heterogeneity environments, those problems do not exist 
and, hence, VSM exhibits no advantage over KI or CJF. 
 Our results exhibit some interesting if speculative managerial implications. First, improved 
institutional forecasts can be achieved with VSM over the other two approaches, with that improvement 
being significant in environments with high knowledge-heterogeneity. VSMs are especially attractive in 
institutional settings where the variable to be forecasted is difficult to predict and where the type and quality 
of information and knowledge vary between the informants. Judgement-based sales forecasts for new 
products can often be characterized in such a manner. Also, VSMs do no worse than CJF or KI in low 
knowledge-heterogeneity environments, making it a relatively robust choice for such forecasting tasks. 
Secondly, since VSMs are superior to CJFs in the high knowledge-heterogeneity environment and KI is no 
worse than CJF in the low knowledge-heterogeneity environment, it may be that the CJF approach should be 
a third choice option in most institutional forecasting environments. Our results also provide critical 
justification for the widely-used key informant approach, but, going beyond the work of Phillips (1981) and 
others, specifying conditions when that approach should be expected to perform poorly. 
 From a theoretical standpoint, our results provide a possible explanation for when and why a VSM 
might be expected to work in an institutional forecasting framework. However, as with much research of a 
relatively early nature, our results also provide opportunities for future study. First, our procedure screened 
our low and medium knowledge individuals. A key question arises here about the robustness of any of these 
approaches to inclusion of such individuals. It may be that thin VSMs are subject to the winner's curse, where 
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several low knowledge individuals drive the VSM to inefficient outcomes. And we have (arbitrarily) set the 
size of the VSMs to six individuals in our experiment. We have no data on how the performance of VSMs 
varies with group size. In addition, given our arguments about knowledge sharing in high-knowledge-
heterogeneity environments as the explanation for VSM performance, it would be useful to directly compare 
other repeated information-sharing mechanisms, perhaps of the repeated-Delphi type. Such systems are 
becoming increasingly available and web-based implementations make such collaborations increasingly easy 
(see (Cil, Alpturk, and Yazgan 2005), for example). 
 While there are clearly many other research opportunities here, we reemphasize our main findings: 
VSMs are feasible for the institutional forecasting problems cited here and they appear to provide forecasting 
accuracy that is superior to that of methods that are in common use. As our conclusions are based on results 
from a limited number of variables and markets, future research should address the generalizability of these 
findings. Furthermore, it will be a challenge for both academics and practitioners to further refine both the 
benefits and the costs of the VSM approach.  
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Appendix A 
Screener Instrument 
Screening Questionnaire:  
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine whether or not you are a good match for our study. Please 
answer the questions below by circling “true” or “false” to indicate whether you feel the statement is true or 
false. 
 
General Football Questions 
1. Penn State plays in the Big East Conference.   True False 
2. A team must go 10 yards or more to get a first down.   True False 
3. A team gets 7 points for a field goal.   True False 
4. The quarterback gets the ball from the center.   True False 
5. A football game lasts 60 minutes on the official clock.  True False 
6. Each team can have up to 15 men on the field.  True False 
7. A “sack” occurs when the quarterback is tackled  
behind the line of scrimmage when he is trying to pass.  True False 
8. A team gets 3 points for a safety.   True False 
9. Suppose you participated in an office football pool, and you received  
Penn State + 3 points against Iowa. If Iowa wins by a score of 24-22,  
you lose your bet.  True False 
10. Suppose in your office pool, you received Penn State + 3 points against Iowa.  
(Same as above.) If Penn State wins by 21-20, you win your bet.  True False 
 
General Trading Questions 
1. It is better to buy high and sell low than buy low and sell high.   True False 
2. When you buy common stock, you own a percentage of a company.   True False 
3. Dividends are paid out when a stock splits.   True False 
4. Dow Jones is a well-respected radio financial commentator.   True False 
5. The Fortune 500 is the 500 best stock picks of the day.   True False 
6. You should buy a stock when its price is lower than you think it should be. True False 
7. Nasdaq is the name of a stock exchange.  True False 
8. A barrel of crude oil sells for about $1.80.  True False  
9. Diversifying your portfolio is a way to increase your level of risk.   True False 
10. If a stock currently sells at $10, and you believe it will decrease to a  
$5 selling price by the end of the year, you should sell the stock.  True False 
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Appendix B 
Instrument to Measure Knowledge of Football and of Financial Markets 
To assess your knowledge of college football, which of these rules differ between college and NFL football: 
 
1. Offsides penalty rule  ____ Same ____ Different 
2. Pass interference penalty rule ____ Same ____ Different 
3. Feet in bounds for a reception rule  ____ Same  ____ Different 
4. Two point conversion rule ____ Same ____ Different 
5. Number of time outs in a half  ____ Same  ____ Different 
6. Overtime rules  ____ Same ____ Different 
7. First down clock rule  ____ Same  ____ Different 
8. Position of hash marks ____ Same  ____ Different 
9. Field size ____ Same ____ Different 
10. Time between downs ____ Same  ____ Different 
 
To assess your knowledge of financial markets, please answer the following questions: 
 
1. The New York Stock Exchange is a place where  
exchange trading takes place.  True False 
2. Shares of common stock always pay dividends. True False 
3. Preferred stock ownership usually ensures voting rights  
in a company. True False 
4. If many people want to sell a stock, and few want to buy, then the price of  
the stock rises. True False 
5. A market order means you can buy, for example, 
100 shares of a certain company immediately, regardless 
 of price. True False 
6. A stock’s P/E ratio is the value of the company divided  
by the annual earnings per share. True False 
7. An investor diversifies their portfolio to increase  
volatility and risk. True False 
8. A prospectus is a document that discloses information  
about financial consulting/advising firms. True False 
9. A portfolio is all securities, real estate, or other investment tools held by a stockholder. 
 True False 
10. A treasury bond typically has a time to maturity of more than 1 year after the issue date. 
 True  False 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Main Information Characteristics of the Virtual Stock Market (VSM) and the 
Combining Judgmental Forecasts (CJF) Approach to Forecasting 
 
 Combined Judgmental Forecasts Virtual Stock Markets 
Information Elicitation 
• About forecasted variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• About knowledge and 
confidence  
 
 
 
 
 
• Direct and explicit 
measurement of variables of 
interest 
• Information available at the 
level of the individual 
informant. 
• Incentives for providing 
biased information may be 
present 
 
 
• Direct (self)assessments of 
knowledge and/or 
confidence 
• Straightforward and relatively 
easy for informant 
 
• Indirect measurement of 
variables of interest 
through observation of 
trading behavior 
• Information provided not 
directly visible 
• Incentives for speculation 
may be present, 
 
 
 
• No direct assessment of 
knowledge and or 
confidence  
• Market participation 
relatively complex for 
informants 
Information Exchange • Only public information 
shared 
 
• Participants exchange 
private information, which 
becomes public through 
trading  
Information Aggregation • Aggregation explicitly done 
by the researcher 
• Various alternative (mostly 
proportional) weighting 
schemes can be applied  
• Knowledge-based weighting 
possible 
• Aggregation implicitly done 
through market mechanism 
• Disproportional weighting 
of the input of the 
strongest believer 
 
 
Note: The Key Information approach, a special case of Combined Judgmental Forecasts, shares the 
Combined Judgmental Forecasts characteristics for Information Elicitation while Information Exchange and 
Information Aggregation considerations do not apply 
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Table 2 
Forecasting Accuracy of the Key Informant (KI), Combined Judgmental Forecast (CJF) and Virtual Stock Markets 
MAPE (Standard Deviation) averaged across 12 Days 
  Key Informant Combined Judgmental Forecast Virtual Stock 
Markets 
   Unweighted Knowledge-Based 
Weighted 
Confidence-
Based Weighted 
 
 
Football Point Spreads 
 
 
 
Financial Indices 
OSU 
FSU 
Mean 
 
Oil Price 
Dow Jones 
Mean 
.354 (.216) 
1.050 (1.12) 
.702 (.866) 
 
.087 (.028) 
.075 (.101) 
.081 (.072) 
.304 (.121) 
.630 (.305) 
.467 (.281) 
 
.102 (.050) 
.029 (.014) 
.065 (.052) 
.301 (.129) 
.672 (.337) 
.486 (.313) 
 
.099 (.045) 
.030 (.019) 
.065 (.049) 
.307 (.111) 
.640 (.292) 
.473 (.275) 
 
.090 (.030) 
.023 (.010) 
.056 (.041) 
.230 (.060) 
.356 (.194) 
.293 (.154) 
 
.113 (.017) 
.071 (.044) 
.092 (.039) 
Mean  .406 (.697) .276 (.288) .286 (.311) .275 (.290) .188 (.149) 
 
 
Table 2A 
Forecasting Accuracy of the Key Informant (KI), Combined Judgmental Forecast (CJF) and Virtual Stock Markets 
MAPE (Standard Deviation) averaged across full 22 Days 
  Key Informant Combined Judgmental Forecast Virtual Stock 
Markets 
   Unweighted Knowledge-Based 
Weighted 
Confidence-
Based Weighted 
 
 
Football Point Spreads 
 
 
 
Financial Indices 
OSU 
FSU 
Mean 
 
Oil Price 
Dow Jones 
Mean 
.333 (.121) 
.920 (.978) 
.626 (.750) 
 
.095 (.033) 
.075 (.093) 
.085 (.069) 
.316 (.106) 
.602 (.274) 
.459 (.250) 
 
.108 (.076) 
.037 (.019) 
.072 (.065) 
.312 (.105) 
.642 (.301) 
.477 (.278) 
 
.105 (.067) 
.038 (.021) 
.071 (.059) 
.318 (.095) 
.618 (.266) 
.468 (.248) 
 
.092 (.042) 
.030 (.015) 
.061 (.044) 
.232 (.054) 
.319 (.175) 
.275 (.134) 
 
.113 (.013) 
.079 (.036) 
.096 (.032) 
Mean  .369 (.604) .275 (.269) .284 (.288) .274 (.273) .181 (.131) 
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Figure 1a 
Introductory Screen of the Virtual Stock Market (VSM) 
 
Figure 1b 
Explanatory Screen of Virtual Stock Market (VSM) for Oil Prices 
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Figure 1c 
Explanatory Screen of Virtual Stock Market (VSM) for Football Point Spread Shares 
 
Figure 1d 
Portfolio Screen of Virtual Stock Market (VSM) for Financial Shares 
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Figure 2: Mean Absolute Percentage Errors for the Financial Indices Forecasts 
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Note: Graphs exclude first and last five days of the market; Day 1 refers to 6th day of trading
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Figure 3: Mean Absolute Percentage Errors for the Football Point Spread Forecasts 
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Note: Graphs exclude first and last five days of the market; Day 1 refers to 6th day of trading 
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